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ABSTRACT     National surveys indicate that Americans hold greater prejudice toward atheists than many other historically stigmatized groups. The religious prosociality perspective posits that people will demonstrate prejudice toward anyone who does not believe in a monitoring and punishing god, including atheists, because of the perception that those who lack belief in a monitoring and punishing god cannot be trusted to act in a prosocial manner. The sociofunctional perspective posits that people will demonstrate distinct forms of prejudice toward individuals who present certain types of threats to the group, and previous research suggests that atheists are perceived as posing a threat to group values. In the current study, participants rated targets whose values largely matched their own values more favorably than targets whose values did not largely match their own values. Also, participants rated both targets who believed in a monitoring and punishing god and targets who believed in a god who does not monitor nor punish more favorably than atheist targets. These judgments spanned a variety of measures, including emotional reactions to the target, judgments of target traits, and preferred social distance from the target. Results were consistent with the sociofunctional perspective but did not support the religious prosociality perspective. 
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Americans hold extreme prejudice toward some groups, including Blacks, 
Hispanics, gay men, Muslims, fundamentalist Christians, immigrants, and 
criminals. However, recent work suggests that Americans may hold the greatest 
prejudice toward atheists. People have more negative feelings toward atheists than 
gay men and people perceive atheists as less trustworthy than rapists (Gervais, 
Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). In a nationally representative survey conducted by 
Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006), almost 50% of respondents agreed that 
they would disapprove of their child wanting to marry an atheist compared to 
about 27% disapproving of an African American, 19% disapproving of a 
Hispanic, and 7% disapproving of a Conservative Christian. This same survey 
found Americans to be more accepting of both homosexual people and recent 
immigrants than atheists (Edgell et al., 2006). Atheists are also rated less 
favorably than Muslims. A national survey found that 54% of respondents rated 
Muslim-Americans favorably, which is considerably greater than the 34% who 
rated atheists favorably (Pew Research Center, 2002). Finally, my own work 
suggests that people would like to maintain the greatest amount of social distance 
from atheists as compared to Jews, Christians, Muslims, theists, and 
fundamentalist Christians (Varley, Filip-Crawford, & Nagoshi, 2012). 
 Given this anti-atheist sentiment, it seems reasonable that many people 
would choose to forgo self-identifying as “atheist.” Less than half of those who 
claim to not believe in God choose to label themselves as “atheist” (Zuckerman, 
2007). However, non-belief in God ranks as the fourth most commonly held belief 
system in the world; estimates for those who do not believe in God (defined as 
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self-identified atheists, agnostics, and nonbelievers in a “personal god”) range 
from 505 million people to 749 million people world-wide, placing nonbelievers 
behind followers of Hinduism (900 million), Islam (1.2 billion), and Christianity 
(2 billion) (Zuckerman, 2007). 
However, the prevalence of nonbelievers varies widely by country. 
Figures range from 65% of respondents in Japan reporting that they do not believe 
in God to 44% in France, 22% in Canada, six percent in the United States, and 
less than one percent in Afghanistan and Kenya (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; 
Inglehart, Basanez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004). Interestingly, 
unlike many other stigmatized groups, prejudice toward atheists decreases as their 
perceived prevalence increases (Gervais, 2011). Given that, in the United States, 
atheists represent a small percentage of the population and they are a relatively 
unrecognized, socially and politically weak group (Martin, 2002), what is the 
impetus behind anti-atheist prejudice? I will examine anti-atheist prejudice from 
two perspectives, each making unique predictions concerning the nature of this 
prejudice: the religious prosociality perspective (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; 
Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008) and the sociofunctional perspective (e.g., Neuberg, 
Smith, & Asher, 2000; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). RELIGIOUS PROSOCIALITY PERSPECTIVE 
The relationship between religious beliefs and social behavior has long 
been a topic of scholarly inquisition. Given that religion is seen as directly related 
to moral behavior, many scientists have begun to tease apart the relationship 
between people’s religious beliefs and their prosocial behaviors. The “religious 
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prosociality” approach argues that religion is an avenue that guides individuals to 
act in ways that benefit others, even at a personal cost (Norenzayan & Shariff, 
2008). However, religious prosociality may develop from two distinct but related 
origins: religious affiliation or beliefs about supernatural agents (Preston, Ritter, 
& Hernandez, 2010). 
Prosociality and Religious Affiliation 
Why should one’s religious affiliation lead to prosocial behavior? From an 
evolutionary perspective, we understand that individuals may act altruistically 
toward kin, since this enhances one’s inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964). 
However, given that larger groups outcompete smaller ones, groups that 
developed cooperative relationships between non-kin could outcompete those that 
did not (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Indirect reciprocity, where one utilizes a 
heuristic that says, “Cooperate with individuals who have a reputation for 
cooperating,” may have been naturally selected for since this allows reciprocal 
relationships to extend beyond kin. However, to function effectively, indirect 
reciprocity requires the existence of a reliable cue for inferring others’ 
cooperative reputations; one’s religious affiliation could serve as this cue (Atran 
& Norenzayan, 2004).  
Since religious practices are costly to perform, one group member could 
judge whether an unfamiliar group member sacrificed for the group based on the 
unfamiliar group member’s religious affiliation (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). 
Basically, if an unfamiliar group member identified as the same religious 
affiliation as oneself, one could assume that this group member performed costly 
4 
sacrifices for your shared religious group and was therefore worthy of a 
cooperative, reciprocal relationship (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). As Norenzayan 
and Shariff (2008) state: 
Religious behaviors and rituals, if more costly to cooperating group 
members than to freeloaders, may have reliably signaled the presence of 
devotion and, therefore, cooperative intention toward ingroup 
members…Religious prosociality, thus, may have softened the limitations 
that kinship-based and (direct or indirect) reciprocity-based altruism place 
on group size. (p. 58) 
Since sharing one’s religious affiliation served as a reliable cue for establishing 
cooperative relationships, people came to act prosocially towards those who share 
their religious affiliation. 
Similarly, religious affiliation may have served to extend our innate 
altruistic kin-directed tendencies toward non-kin by conceptualizing those who 
share our religious beliefs as an extended family (Batson, 1983). By 
conceptualizing religious groups as “brotherhoods,” people could execute and 
benefit from activities that could not be performed alone, in pairs, or only with kin 
(Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). Thus, religious affiliation may have promoted 
prosocial behavior by serving as a reliable cue for indirect reciprocity and 
extending kin-like relationships beyond one’s immediate family.  
Prosociality and Beliefs about Supernatural Agents 
However, religious beliefs specifically concerning supernatural agents 
may also have facilitated prosocial behavior. Since indirect reciprocal 
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relationships function by cooperating with others who have a reputation for 
cooperating, groups should be especially concerned about members who have a 
reputation for acting selfishly (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Once a selfish group 
member is detected, the group may exclude or punish him (Norenzayan & Shariff, 
2008). Indeed, groups that punish free-riders (i.e., people who benefit from group 
efforts without contributing) stabilize cooperative behavior and outcompete 
groups that do not punish free-riders (Henrich, 2006). Thus, to avoid exclusion or 
punishment, humans should be especially concerned about being perceived as 
free-riders (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Given that humans judge others by 
monitoring their behavior, humans should, and do, act more prosocially when 
they feel they are being watched (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Haley & Fessler, 
2005). However, it is difficult to directly monitor, and subsequently reward or 
punish, others’ behaviors in large groups. 
It is possible that to deal with the problem of humans’ inability to monitor 
and punish others’ behaviors, our ancestors may have outsourced this monitoring 
and punishing to supernatural agents (Gervais et al., 2011). If people believe that 
they are being watched and may be appropriately punished, whether by humans or 
supernatural agents, they should behave more prosocially. In fact, people increase 
their socially desirable responding when primed with thoughts of God and they 
cheat less when they view God as more punishing and less loving (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011). Thus, given people’s concern 
for maintaining a reputation as cooperators (and not free-loaders), belief in 
monitoring and punishing supernatural agents may have promoted prosocial 
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behavior by inducing individuals to feel that they are being watched and may be 
punished if they act selfishly. 
God Images 
 The religious prosociality literature more generally refers to monitoring 
and punishing supernatural agents as “moralizing gods” or “morally concerned 
gods.” A moralizing god is defined as a “High God” (i.e., “a spiritual being who 
is believed to have created all reality and/or to be its ultimate governor, even 
though his/her sole act was to create other spirits who, in turn, created or control 
the natural world” (p. 129)) who is present and active in human affairs and who is 
specifically supportive of human morality (Roes & Raymond, 2011). Thus, a 
moralizing god is distinct from both a High God who is present but not active in 
human affairs and a High God who is present and active in human affairs but who 
is not supportive of human morality (Roes & Raymond, 2011). Importantly, 
cultural belief in moralizing gods is positively related to group size; so, even 
though most world cultures do not endorse moralizing gods, the majority of the 
world’s religious adherents do believe in moralizing gods (Roes & Raymond, 
2011). Also, although the concept of a “moralizing god” and a “monitoring and 
punishing god” seem somewhat distinct, the world’s most widespread religions 
often describe supernatural agents as able to monitor, reward, and punish human 
behavior (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). 
 The concept of a monitoring and punishing god appears to fit well with 
Froese and Bader’s (2007) model of god images. Froese and Bader (2007) 
measure an individual’s god image as two dimensions: God’s level of engagement 
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in the world and God’s level of judgment. Beliefs about God’s level of 
engagement are measured with items like, “God is removed from worldly affairs” 
and “God is concerned with the well-being of the world” while beliefs about 
God’s level of judgment are measured with items like, “God is angered by human 
sins” and description of God as “wrathful” (Froese & Bader, 2007, p. 468). So it 
seems likely that a person who believes in a monitoring and punishing god would 
score highly on both God engagement (believing in an Active God) and God 
judgment (believing in an Authoritative God) (Froese & Bader, 2008). Typically, 
people tend to view God as highly engaged and moderately judgmental, and these 
dimensions are positively correlated with one another (Froese & Bader, 2007). 
 Importantly, Froese and Bader’s (2007) god image model seems to better 
fit the concept of a monitoring and punishing god than other models. Researchers 
who examine god image as it relates to attachment style might distinguish 
people’s god concepts as those of a Loving God (e.g. forgiving, caring, 
accepting), a Controlling God (e.g. restricting, controlling), and a Distant God 
(e.g. unresponsive, unavailable, impersonal) (Kirkpatrick, 1998). Although 
believing in a Controlling God is likely positively related to believing that God 
punishes one’s behavior and believing in a Distant God is likely negatively related 
to believing that God monitors one’s behavior, both of these concepts focus on 
one’s relationship with God as a personal caregiver figure, which seems 
theoretically distinct from beliefs about God’s moral concern about human life in 
general. Other work that distinguishes between omnipotent, omnipresent, 
omniscient, and eternal God concepts (Trimeche, Vinsonneau, & Mullet, 2006) 
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also seems less applicable to the concept of a monitoring and punishing god than 
Froese and Bader’s construction. 
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SOCIOFUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
The central tenet of the sociofunctional approach to prejudice is that, 
rather than conceptualizing prejudice as a general evaluation or attitude, prejudice 
should be conceptualized as qualitatively distinct emotions which stem from 
perceptions of specific tangible threats (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Since 
interdependent group living is essential to human survival and reproduction, 
humans should be especially attuned to threats to effective group living, such as 
resource threats (e.g., threats to territory, economic resources, and physical 
security) or operational integrity threats (e.g., threats to reciprocity, 
communication, and common values) (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Once a person 
recognizes a threat to himself or the in-group, he should experience an emotional 
reaction relevant to that threat and psychological or behavioral responses designed 
to minimize the threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). 
For example, if an out-group, such as gay men, is perceived as posing a 
threat to the ingroup’s physical health (i.e., the out-group spreads contagious 
disease), this should elicit an emotional reaction of disgust and a motivation to 
minimize contamination (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). However, if an out-group, 
such as Mexican-Americans, is perceived as a threat to the in-group’s property, 
this should elicit an emotional reaction of anger and a motivation to secure the in-
group’s property (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Thus, people should have distinct 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions toward groups such as thieves, 
cheaters, traitors, and the physically disabled since each of these groups poses a 
unique threat to the group (Neuberg et al., 2000). 
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Atheist Threat 
Little research has addressed either the threat that atheists are seen to pose 
or specific emotional reactions to atheists. However, Gervais et al. (2011) found 
strong evidence that atheists are seen as untrustworthy (i.e., a trust threat) while 
Edgell et al. (2006) postulate that atheists are perceived as a symbolic moral and 
cultural “other”, possibly representing a threat to the in-group’s values or a threat 
to social coordination. As Edgell et al. (2006) state: 
To be an atheist…is not to be one more religious minority among many in 
a strongly pluralist society. Rather, Americans construct the atheist as the 
symbolic representation of one who rejects the basis for moral solidarity 
and cultural membership in American society altogether. (p. 230) 
Ritter and Preston (2011) found that exposure to an atheist text (Richard 
Dawkins’ The God Delusion) elicited a disgust reaction from participants. 
Although Ritter and Preston (2011) explain this reaction in terms of a perceived 
spiritual purity violation, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) hypothesize that a disgust 
reaction should be elicited by either a perceived threat to group health or group 
values. Findings from Varley et al. (2012) similarly demonstrate that the strongest 
emotional reaction to atheists is moral disgust (see Figure 1). As would be 
predicted by the sociofunctional perspective, Varley et al. also found that atheists 
were perceived as posing the greatest threat to values, and this perceived values 
threat was more pronounced than a perceived threat to trust (see Figure 2). 
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The Importance of Shared Values 
Why should the perception that atheists hold different values be especially 
threatening? The sociofunctional perspective more broadly categorizes people 
perceived to hold different values as counter-socializers (Neuberg et al., 2000). 
Efficiently navigating the world requires a vast amount of information that is not 
innate to humans; as such, people strongly invest in educating and socializing the 
youth (Neuberg et al., 2000). Individuals who appear to endorse values 
incompatible with those of others, especially core values, may be seen as 
interfering with necessary socialization processes and therefore threatening the 
effective functioning of the group (Neuberg et al., 2000). 
Previous research suggests that perceived value similarity between groups 
is negatively related to intergroup antagonism (Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990). 
Similarly, a positive relationship exists between perceived in-group/out-group 
value discrepancy and prejudice toward the out-group (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 
1996). Interestingly, rather than perceiving that outgroups violate their values, 
ingroup members tend to perceive that outgroups share their values, but to a lesser 
degree (Biernat et al., 1996). As such, prejudice may be more strongly related to 
the perception that the outgroup is less supportive of the ingroup’s values rather 
than the perception that the outgroup violates the ingroup’s values (Biernat et al., 
1996). 
Religious Values 
The majority of work on the relationship between religion and values has 
utilized Schwartz’s (1994) conception of values. First, Schwartz (1994) states: 
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A value is a (1) belief (2) pertaining to desirable end states or modes of 
conduct, that (3) transcends specific situations, (4) guides selection or 
evaluation of behavior, people, and events, and (5) is ordered by 
importance relative to other values to form a system of value priorities. (p. 
20) 
More specifically, Schwartz (1994) defines values as transsituational goals that 
motivate action and serve as standards for justifying and judging action. As such, 
values are distinguishable from needs, attitudes, and preferences.  
Schwartz (1994) has defined ten motivational values, which relate to three 
universal human goals of providing for humans’ biological needs, coordinating 
social interaction, and maintaining the survival and smooth functioning of groups. 
Schwartz’s ten values are as follows: (1) power (i.e., social status and prestige), 
(2) achievement (i.e., personal success), (3) hedonism (i.e., sensuous 
gratification), (4) stimulation (i.e., excitement and novelty), (5) self-direction (i.e., 
independent thought and action), (6) universalism (i.e., protecting the welfare of 
all people and nature), (7) benevolence (i.e., enhancing the welfare of people with 
whom one is in frequent personal contact), (8) tradition (i.e., accepting the 
customs that culture and religion provide), (9) conformity (i.e., restraint of actions 
likely to harm others), and (10) security (i.e., safety and stability of society, 
relationships, and self).  
According to Schwartz (1994), some values are complementary while 
others are incompatible (i.e., pursuing one value may conflict with the pursuit of 
another value). As such, the ten values are conceptualized as having a circular 
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structure with complementary values next to each other and incompatible values 
opposing each other (Schwartz, 1994). There are two basic conflicts represented 
in this circular structure: self-enhancement values (e.g., power and achievement) 
versus self-transcendence values (e.g., benevolence and universalism) and 
openness to change values (e.g., self-direction and stimulation) versus 
conservatism values (e.g., security, conformity, and tradition) (Roccas, 2005). The 
structural relationship of these values has been confirmed across many studies and 
has been validated in more than 50 countries (Roccas, 2005; Saroglou, Delpierre, 
& Dernelle, 2004). Finally, self-reported value priorities relate in a meaningful 
way to actual behaviors like political, environmental, consumer, prosocial, and 
antisocial behaviors (Saroglou et al., 2004). 
Multiple cross-cultural studies have examined the relationship between 
religiosity and values. A meta-analysis from 21 independent samples in 15 
different countries concluded that religiosity is positively related to placing high 
importance on tradition and conformity and placing low importance on hedonism, 
stimulation, and self-direction (Saroglou et al., 2004). This pattern of relationships 
holds across different countries, religions, and denominations (Saroglou et al., 
2004). Religiosity was also positively related to security and benevolence, and 
negatively related to universalism, achievement, and power, but these 
relationships were weaker than those mentioned earlier (Saroglou et al., 2004). 
Despite the fact that, across religions, more religious people tend to value 
conservatism and to devalue openness to change, I have found no study using 
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Schwartz’s model that reports differences in value hierarchies across religious 
groups. Roccas (2005) highlights: 
The similarity in the pattern of correlations of values and religiosity across 
various denominations does not imply that different religious groups hold 
identical value hierarchies. These patterns of correlation reflect differences 
within each religious group, but they do not exclude the existence of value 
differences across religions. (p. 753) 
Studies utilizing other conceptions of values have found that religious 
groups differ in their value hierarchies. Rokeach (1973) reports similarities and 
differences in value hierarchies across religious groups. Religious groups 
similarly rank family security, a world at peace, and freedom as the most 
important values and pleasure, social recognition, an exciting life, and a world of 
beauty as the least important values (Rokeach, 1973). In terms of differences, 
Rokeach (1973) compared American Jews, Christians, and nonbelievers. Jews 
valued family security, equality, pleasure, inner harmony, wisdom, and personal 
competence more highly than Christians while Christians emphasized values 
concerning cleanliness, obedience, politeness, salvation, and forgiveness more so 
than both Jews and nonbelievers (Rokeach, 1973).  In terms of cross-cultural 
analyses, Inglehart and Baker (2000) conclude that value differences between 
religious groups are smaller within a nation than across nations; for example, a 
Muslim and a Jew will have more similar values within a nation than a Muslim 
and a Jew from two different nations.  
15 
Finally, I have not found any study examining the perceived values of 
religious groups, aside from a study by Roccas (2003) (as cited in Roccas, 2005), 
which examines the perceived values of one’s religious ingroup. Since findings 
from Varley et al. (2012) suggest that atheists are seen as a values threat, it 
seemed necessary to run a pilot study establishing the perceived values of a target 
who believes in god and a target who does not believe in god, and to compare 
these perceived values to the participant’s own self-reported values. In a between-
subjects design with three levels, 200 participants from an undergraduate Social 
Psychology course at Arizona State University (mean age = 21.30 years, 125 
females, 73 males, 1 “other” gender) were randomly assigned to rate either their 
own values, the perceived values of a target who believes in god, or the perceived 
values of a target who does not believe in god. The items used to assess values 
ratings were adapted from the European Social Survey (Bilsky, Janik, & 
Schwartz, 2011), a 21-item assessment of Schwartz’s 10 motivation values. 
Participants reported that an atheist target values self-transcendence values 
(universalism and benevolence) and conservation values (conformity, tradition, 
and security) less so than themselves. In terms of a values hierarchy, the atheist 
target was seen as most strongly valuing openness to change, followed by self-
enhancement, self-transcendence, and finally conservation. Also, participants 
rated the target who believes in god as valuing conservation values (conformity 
and tradition) more so than themselves but universalism, achievement, and 
openness to change values (hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction) less so than 
themselves. Overall, atheists are seen as weakly valuing self-transcendence and 
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conservation, and people may feel threatened by this perceived values 
discrepancy. Finally, it is important to note that people may perceive belief in 
God as a value in itself, although I have not found any literature exploring this 
possibility. 
  
17 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF THE PERSPECTIVES 
Although I will contrast the predictions made by these two perspectives, I 
do not conceptualize these perspectives as mutually exclusive. I believe that the 
god belief and values threat mechanisms may both influence prejudice toward 
atheists. Both perspectives share basic assumptions concerning the costs and 
benefits of large group living and both postulate that people should demonstrate 
prejudice toward individuals perceived to threaten the group. However, the 
perspectives differ in their focus on specific threats. The religious prosociality 
perspective focuses specifically on threats related to religious beliefs and practices 
(e.g., religious affiliation and god beliefs) while the sociofunctional perspective 
focuses on broad threats, including perceived values threat. 
At this point, the perspectives become functionally intertwined again 
because one could argue that, if a target does not share one’s religious affiliation 
or god beliefs, that this may result in a perceived values difference. As noted 
previously, it is possible that people perceive belief in God, or belief in a 
moralizing god, as a value in itself, such that lacking belief in God constitutes a 
values difference. So, perception of another’s religious affiliation or god beliefs 
may be confounded with judgments of values difference or similarity. Although 
perceptions of target god beliefs are likely related to judgments of values 
similarity, I will independently manipulate these variables in order to examine 
their unique effects. 
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CURRENT STUDY 
The current study sought to explore prejudice toward atheists by 
contrasting the predictions derived from the religious prosociality perspective and 
the sociofunctional perspective. The religious prosociality perspective predicts 
that people should anticipate cooperative interactions with, and therefore desire to 
interact with, both others who share their religious affiliation and others who 
believe in a monitoring and punishing god (i.e., a moralizing god). Since the 
defining feature of atheists is a lack of belief in the existence of god, the religious 
prosociality perspective predicts that people should anticipate non-cooperative 
interactions with, and therefore desire to avoid interaction with, atheists because 
atheists do not believe in a moralizing god.  
The sociofunctional perspective predicts that people should desire to avoid 
interaction with others perceived to pose a threat to the ingroup. To the extent that 
atheists are perceived as posing a threat to the group’s values, people should 
desire to avoid interaction with atheists. To summarize, the religious prosociality 
perspective predicts that people desire to avoid interacting with atheists because 
atheists do not believe in a moralizing god whereas the sociofunctional 
perspective predicts that people desire to avoid interacting with atheists because 
they believe that atheists pose a threat to the group, and research suggests that 
atheists are seen as a greatest threat to group values. 
In order to contrast these predictions, I directly compared the effects of 
target god beliefs and target value similarity on prejudice and discrimination 
toward the target. As such, my first independent variable was value similarity 
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between the participant and the target: the target was portrayed as either (1) 
sharing a large amount of the participant’s values (i.e., a high values match) or (2) 
sharing a small amount of the participant’s values (i.e., a low values match). My 
second independent variable was the target’s beliefs about god: the target was 
portrayed as either (1) an atheist who does not believe in god, (2) believing in a 
god who monitor’s and punishes one’s behavior (i.e., a moralizing god) or, (3) 
believing in a god who does not monitor and does not punish one’s behaviors 
(i.e., a non-moralizing god).  
The religious prosociality perspective makes no explicit prediction about 
anticipated interactions with individuals who believe in a god who does not 
monitor nor punish. However, if the cue for a cooperative interaction with another 
is truly that the other believes in a monitoring and punishing god, then people 
should desire to avoid interacting with a believer in a non-monitoring, non-
punishing god as much as an atheist.  
The main dependent variables of interest were participant ratings of the 
extent to which they would prefer to interact with the target across a variety of 
activities. Participants were led to believe that a face-to-face interaction would 
occur between themselves and the target. Participants were asked to rate how 
much they would prefer to participate in a variety of activities with the target 
under the assumption that they would perform whichever activity they rated the 
most favorably. The activities to be rated included an activity that required 
cooperation between participant and target (i.e., cooperation activity), an activity 
that required trust (i.e., trust activity), an activity that required competition (i.e., 
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competition activity), an activity that required conversation but without 
cooperation/trust/competition (i.e., conversation activity), and an activity that 
required the participant and target to meet but without further interaction (i.e., 
minimal interaction activity). Other dependent variables included ratings of target 
characteristics, emotional reactions toward the target, and preferred social 
distance from the target. 
Hypotheses 
1. Religious Prosociality Perspective: 
a. Participants will prefer to perform the cooperation and trust activities with 
targets who believe in a monitoring and punishing god (i.e., a moralizing 
god) more so than targets who believe in a non-monitoring and non-
punishing god (i.e., a non-moralizing god) and atheist targets (see Figure 
3). 
b. Participants will prefer to avoid performing the cooperation and trust 
activities with both atheist targets and targets who believe in a non-
moralizing god, and there will be no difference in the preference for these 
activities between atheist targets and targets who believe in a non-
moralizing god (see Figure 3). 
c. Participants will demonstrate no preference to perform the competition 
activity, the conversation activity, or the minimal interaction activity as a 
function of target god belief (see Figure 4). 
d. The targets’ values match with the participant will not have an effect on 
preference for activities. There will be no difference in preference for 
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activities between low values match targets and high values match targets 
(see Figure 3 and Figure 4). 
2. Sociofunctional Perspective: 
a. Participants will prefer to perform cooperation and trust activities with 
high values match targets more so than low values match targets (see 
Figure 5). 
b. Participants will prefer to avoid performing the cooperation and trust 
activities with low values match targets (see Figure 5). 
c. Participants will demonstrate no preference to perform the competition 
activity, the conversation activity, or the minimal interaction activity as a 
function of target values match (see Figure 6). 
d. The targets’ god beliefs will not have an effect on preference for activities. 
There will be no difference in preference for activities between atheist 
targets, targets who believe in a moralizing god, and targets who believe in 
a non-moralizing god (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). 
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METHODS 
Participants 
 Three hundred and eighty-five participants from the introductory 
psychology subject pool at Arizona State University participated in this study for 
research credit. As the hypothesized processes were expected to apply only to 
people who believe in God, all participants were pre-screened as believing in God 
(as indicated by selecting “Yes, I believe in God.” as opposed to “No, I do not 
believe in God.” on a pre-screening questionnaire). Thirteen of these participants 
were removed because of technical issues during the study, three were removed 
because they failed to complete any of the 38 dependent variable items, six were 
removed because they completed the survey in less than 25 minutes (average time 
to complete the survey was 42 minutes), four were removed because they had 
been speaking English for less than 6 years, and five were removed who no longer 
appeared to believe in God (strongly disagreed that “God exists” and also strongly 
agreed with the item “I don’t believe in God”); therefore, analyses were 
conducted on 354 participants (144 men, 210 women, mean age = 19.1 years, SD 
age = 2.45). 
Participants were primarily Caucasian (57.9%), with 14.4% identifying as 
Latino/a, 11.3% identifying as biracial/multiracial, 7.3% identifying as Asian, 
3.7% identifying as Black, 2.0% as Native American, and 0.8% as Middle 
Eastern. Religious affiliation data were also collected from the pre-screening 
questionnaire. Of the original pool of 385 participants who participated in the 
study, 25.9% were Christian (non-Catholic), 25.9% were Catholic or Greek 
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Orthodox, 16.8% were “spiritual, but not religious”, 7.8% were agnostic, 3.4% 
were Mormon, 1.3% were Muslim, 6.2% “other”, and 1.0% or less each indicated 
the following religious affiliations: Buddhist, Jewish, Native American, Hindu, 
and atheist. 
Design 
 A 2 (target values match: high versus low) X 3 (target god belief: atheist 
versus believer in a non-moralizing god versus believer in a moralizing god) 
between-subjects design was used. Target gender was matched to participant 
gender, such that female participants rated only female targets and male 
participants rated only male targets. This procedure was adopted in order to avoid 
the possible confound of sexual attraction, which could possibly affect judgments 
in an opposite-sex target design. Participants responded to demographic 
questions, completed a series of inventories and individual difference measures, 
and rated the target on measures of activity preference, target characteristics, 
emotional reactions, and preferred social distance. 
Procedure 
The researcher informed the participant that this was a study designed to 
investigate people’s reactions to online profiles, specifically when given limited 
information in the profiles. The participant was told that she was the activity 
selector in this experiment. As the activity selector, it was her job to look at 
another’s profile and decide which type of activity she would engage in with the 
person in the profile (i.e., the target). The participant was told that she would rate 
how much she would prefer to interact with the target across a variety of 
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activities, after which the participant and the target would meet and perform the 
highest rated activity. The participant was led to believe that the person whose 
profile she would view was in the same building as her but on another floor of the 
building in order to protect the other’s anonymity. 
While the participant was seated in front of a computer, the researcher 
explained that before the participant could view the target’s profile, the participant 
had to fill out her own profile information on the computer. The participant was 
told that the target would not see her profile or personal information, but that it 
was necessary for her to fill out this information because the computer would be 
calculating how well the participant and the target matched on a certain set of 
dimensions. The researcher told the participant that this match information would 
be visible in the profiles. Furthermore, the participant was told that she would 
only be viewing a same-sex target and that there would be no identifying 
information in the target’s profile. 
Although participants completed this survey in the research lab, the study 
was conducted using the online survey software Qualtrics. The participant first 
filled out demographic information and then began to take a series of 
“inventories”. The participant filled out these inventories believing that she would 
be matched to the target on these dimensions. A “religious beliefs” inventory and 
a “values” inventory were included as these relate to the independent variables of 
interest. For further description of the inventories, please see the Materials 
section. 
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Once the participant finished filling out these inventories, information on 
the computer screen stated that the computer system was randomly selecting four 
topics from the inventories she just filled out. The next screen showed that the 
computer system randomly selected the four topics of “life goals, religious 
beliefs, activity preferences, and values.” The participant was told that these four 
pieces of information would be displayed on the profile she would view. The 
participant was told that some of this profile information would be displayed as a 
match percentage, as in “The two of you are an X% favorite foods match.” while 
other information would be displayed as a description, as in “This person enjoys 
Italian food and Japanese food.” 
The computer screen then stated that the target profile was being 
generated for the participant to view. The target’s profile information then 
appeared on the screen, with each piece of profile information presented 
individually. The first screen appeared and indicated the target’s gender, then the 
next screen indicated the target’s age, etc. This ensured that the participant was 
fully aware of all profile information and did not overlook certain information. 
Next, the entire profile appeared on the screen, and the participant rated the target 
on a multitude of items. Once the participant finished recording her reactions, the 
researcher began the debriefing procedure. 
Materials 
Profiles. For an example profile, see Appendix B. All profiles included 
information on the following four dimensions: values, activity preferences, 
religious beliefs, and life goals. Target age, gender, and a brief “about me” section 
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were also displayed. Religious beliefs and activity preferences were presented as 
descriptive information (e.g., “This person believes…”) while life goals and 
values were presented as match information (e.g., “The two of you are an X% 
match). The participant believed that this information was gathered from the 
inventories the target supposedly filled out and synthesized by the computer 
system. 
The information about religious beliefs represented the manipulation of 
the target god belief independent variable. The atheist targets were described as, 
“She/He does not believe in God. She/He is an atheist,” the moralizing god targets 
were described as, “She/He believes in God. She/he believes that God monitors 
one’s behaviors. She/he believes that God punishes one’s bad behaviors,” and the 
non-moralizing god targets were described as, “She/He believes in God. She/he 
does not believe that god monitors one’s behaviors. She/he does not believe that 
God punishes one’s bad behaviors.”  
The information about target values represented the manipulation of the 
target values match independent variable. The low values match targets were 
described as matching the participant’s values 21% while the high values match 
targets were described as matching the participant’s values 91%. Using 
percentages rather than simply classifying the target as a “low, moderate, or high” 
match was intended to give the illusion of variability and to obscure the true intent 
of the study. 
The rest of the information in the profile was filler information intended to 
distract the participant from the variables of interest and provide an illusion of 
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complexity and reality. The targets’ ages were 19 years old, which is close to the 
mean age of the sample. The gender of the target was always matched to 
participant gender. The “about me” section and the “favorite activities” sections 
both gave brief, generic information about the target. Finally, each target was 
presented as a moderate match (60%) on the dimension of life goals. 
Inventories. First, it is important to note that each inventory was labeled 
for the participant with the hope that this labeling would enhance clarity when 
looking at the target profile. For example, the values inventory was clearly labeled 
“Values” so that when the participant saw that she and the target were an X% 
values match, she knew which questions this match information was supposedly 
based on. The “religious beliefs” inventory (7 original items, 14 
Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation items, and 12 Religious Fundamentalism 
items) included items assessing the participant’s beliefs about god’s existence, 
whether god monitors one’s behaviors, punishes one’s bad behaviors, and rewards 
one’s good behaviors. Also included in this “religious beliefs” inventory were the 
Religious Fundamentalism Scale - Revised (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) and 
the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989). 
The “values” inventory was the European Social Survey (Bilsky, Janik, & 
Schwartz, 2011), a 21-item assessment of Schwartz’s 10 motivation values. 
Other inventories included a 13-item “favorite activities” inventory (i.e., 
leisure activities), an 11-item political beliefs inventory, a 15-item “media 
preferences” inventory (e.g., favorite types of music, movies, and books), and a 
17-item “life goals” inventory (e.g., academic goals, career goals, family goals). 
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The participants also completed individual difference measures framed as 
“personality” inventories, “thinking style” inventories, or “beliefs about society” 
inventories. The shortest versions of these inventories and individual difference 
measures were used whenever possible as to not overwhelm the participant. 
Dependent variables. See Appendix C for dependent variable items. 
While looking at each profile, participants assessed how much they would prefer 
to perform a variety of activities with the target, the characteristics they believed 
the target possesses, emotional reactions to the target, and the degree of social 
distance they would prefer to maintain from the target. As previously stated, five 
activities were rated: a cooperation activity, a trust activity, a competition activity, 
a conversation activity, and a minimal interaction activity. After rating each of 
these activities on a Likert scale, the participant was asked to rank order them. 
Next, participants rated the target on the following 12 characteristics: 
trustworthiness, kindness, competence, warmness, cooperativeness, whether the 
target can distinguish right from wrong, generosity, morality, honesty, being 
accepting (as opposed to being judgmental), friendliness, and similarity to the 
participant. Then, the participant indicated emotional reactions to the target with 
one general warmth/coldness item and 16 specific emotional reactions (angry, 
mad, sad, depressed, frightened, afraid, morally disgusted, morally sick, happy, 
joyful, feeling pity, feeling “sorry for them”, feeling sympathy, compassionate, 
entertained, and amused). Importantly, the participant was asked to rate how 
much a person like them would feel each emotion in response to the target, rather 
than to report their personal emotional reactions to the target. Given the limited 
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information the participant had about the target, we thought that participants 
would find it awkward to rate anger, sadness, etc. in response to an individual 
they had never interacted with. Finally, preferred social distance was assessed 
with two items; one item assessed whether the participant would prefer to avoid 
social activities with the target and the other item assessed whether the participant 
would prefer to avoid living with the target as a roommate. This resulted in the 
participant rating the target with a total of 38 items. 
Individual Difference measures. Several individual difference factors 
were also measured. Individual differences in religious attitudes were assessed 
using the Religious Fundamentalism Scale - Revised (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 
2004) (Cronbach’s alpha = .94) and the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation 
Scale (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) (intrinsic religiosity Cronbach’s alpha = .84; 
extrinsic religiosity Cronbach’s alpha = .77). The Religious Fundamentalism 
Scale assesses the belief that there is one religious truth, that evil forces oppose 
this truth, and that those who believe this truth have a special relationship with 
God (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). The Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious 
Orientation Scale measures one’s intrinsic religiosity (i.e., using religion as an end 
in itself) and extrinsic religiosity (i.e., using religion as a means to nonreligious 
ends, such as social affiliation) (Allport, 1966). 
Participants were also measured on Right Wing Authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1981) (Cronbach’s alpha = .90), which assesses one’s beliefs that 
authority should be obeyed, tradition should be followed, and unconventional 
individuals should be punished. This measure allowed me to explore whether 
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negativity toward targets stemmed from general negative attitudes toward 
unconventional individuals. 
Demographics questions. Demographic items included questions about 
age, gender, race, socioeconomic status, sexual orientation, years speaking 
English (for non-native English speakers), and generational status in the United 
States. 
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RESULTS 
Eleven of the twelve trait items were combined into 3 trait composites: 
perceived target warmth, morality, and prosociality. The warmth composite 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .81) contained the warmness, friendliness, kindness, and 
being accepting items. The morality composite (r = .49, p < .001) contained the 
morality and “can distinguish right from wrong” items. The prosociality 
composite (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) contained the generosity, honesty, 
trustworthiness, and cooperativeness items. The trait items indicating perceived 
target similarity to the participant and perceived target competence did not fit well 
on any of these composites and therefore remained individual items. 
The 16 specific emotional reaction items represented 8 emotion constructs, 
each with two items. The two items for each of the 8 constructs were positively, 
significantly correlated with each other (r ranging from .31 to .76, p < .001). 
Therefore, the two items representing each construct were averaged together into 
the following eight emotional reaction composites: anger, fear, sadness, pity, 
moral disgust, happiness, amusement, and compassion. The two social distance 
items were also significantly, positively correlated (r = .59, p < .001), so these 
were averaged together into a composite representing social distance.  
A 2 (values match: high, low) X 3 (target god belief: atheist, non-
moralizing god, moralizing god) X 2 (participant gender: male, female) between-
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for each of the dependent 
variables (preference for five activities, three target characteristics, nine emotional 
reactions, and preferred social distance). Tables 1 through 18 give the means and 
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standard deviations for each condition. Tables 19 through 22 present correlations 
between the dependent measures. Participant gender was included as a predictor 
variable in order to test for possible gender differences in preference for activities. 
For example, there may be a main effect of participant gender such that men 
prefer the competition activity more so than women. 
I performed ANOVA planned comparisons to examine the a priori 
hypotheses. I examined the complex contrast comparing the atheist and non-
moralizing god conditions pooled together to the moralizing god condition 
(contrast coefficients: atheist = -1, non-moralizing god = -1, moralizing god = 2) 
and also performed a simple contrast comparing the atheist condition to the non-
moralizing god condition (contrast coefficients: atheist = 1, non-moralizing god = 
-1, moralizing god = 0). If the religious prosociality perspective were supported, I 
would expect a significant effect of the complex contrast (atheist/non-moralizing 
god vs. moralizing god) and a non-significant effect of the simple contrast (atheist 
vs. non-moralizing god), specifically for the cooperation and trust activities. This 
pattern would suggest that the atheist and non-moralizing god targets are seen as 
significantly different from the moralizing god target, but not seen as significantly 
different from each other. 
Planned Comparisons Results 
Activity preferences dependent measures. The five activity dependent 
measures were largely uncorrelated with each other (see Table 19), so ANOVAs 
were run on each of the five activities separately. However, the cooperation 
activity and competition activity were highly, positively correlated. Both of these 
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activities were framed as “games”, suggesting that participants who were inclined 
to prefer one type of game were also inclined to prefer the other type of game. 
Still, I did not average these two activities together because examining the effects 
of the independent variables on participants’ preferences to play a game did not 
seem relevant to the theories being examined. 
For all five of the activity dependent measures, the complex contrast 
comparing the pooled atheist and non-moralizing god conditions to the moralizing 
god condition was not significant and there were no significant interactions with 
the complex contrast. For all five of the activity dependent measures, the simple 
contrast comparing the atheist and non-moralizing god conditions was not 
significant and there were no significant interactions with the simple contrast, 
except for a significant interaction between the simple contrast and values match 
for the competition activity, F(1, 341) = 5.31, p = .022. 
As stated previously, the religious prosociality perspective would predict 
significant effects of the complex contrast and non-significant effects of the 
simple contrast. As such, I will report significant effects of both the complex 
contrast and the simple contrast, but I will not elaborate upon, discuss, or interpret 
these contrast effects unless they fit the pattern predicted by the religious 
prosociality perspective. Instead, results of omnibus tests will be reported later 
and this will allow for further discussion and interpretation of the effects of the 
target god belief variable. Also, significant effects of both the values match and 
gender variables will be discussed later in the “omnibus test results” section. 
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Perceived target traits dependent measures. For all three of the 
perceived target traits (warmth, morality, and prosociality), the contrast effects 
pattern predicted by the religious prosociality perspective was not supported. 
However, there were significant main effects of both the complex contrast (such 
that the atheist/non-moralizing god targets were rated lower on these traits than 
the moralizing god targets) [warmth: F(1, 341) = 4.06, p = .045; morality: F(1, 
337) = 27.65, p < .001; prosociality: F(1, 337) = 9.61, p = .002] and the simple 
contrast (such that atheist targets were rated lower than non-moralizing god 
targets) [warmth: F(1, 341) = 12.51, p < .001; morality: F(1, 337) = 16.21, p < 
.001; prosociality: F(1, 337) = 8.17, p = .005]. Also, for both perceived target 
warmth and prosociality, there was a significant interaction between the simple 
contrast and gender [warmth: F(1, 341) = 6.94, p = .009; prosociality: F(1, 337) = 
8.28, p = .004]. For perceived target warmth, morality, and prosociality, there 
were no other significant interactions with either the complex contrast or the 
simple contrast. 
Emotional reactions dependent measures. The five negative emotional 
reactions (anger, fear, sadness, pity, and moral disgust) were all strongly, 
positively correlated with each other; similarly, most of the positive emotional 
reactions (happiness, amusement, compassion, general warmth) were strongly, 
positively correlated (see Table 20). However, the authors chose to not average 
the emotion measures into either a negative emotion or a positive emotion 
composite. The sociofunctional approach takes a functionally specific view of 
emotions; different events evoke different emotions and these distinct emotions 
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relate to specific cognitive, physiological, and behavioral tendencies (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). As such, it seemed beneficial to leave each emotional reaction as 
a unique dependent measure, rather than averaging them together. 
For all nine of the emotional reactions to the target (anger, fear, sadness, 
pity, moral disgust, general warmth, happiness, amusement, and compassion), the 
contrast effects pattern predicted by the religious prosociality perspective was not 
supported. For the five negative emotional reactions (anger, fear, sadness, pity, 
and moral disgust) there were no main effects of the complex contrast or 
significant interactions with the complex contrast. However, for all five of these 
negative emotional reactions, there was a significant main effect of the simple 
contrast [anger: F(1, 338) = 14.21, p < .001; fear: F(1, 337) = 5.71, p = .017; 
sadness: F(1, 338) = 10.99, p = .001; pity: F(1, 338) = 5.78, p = .017; moral 
disgust: F(1, 337) = 19.18, p < .001], i.e. greater negative emotional reactions 
were elicited by the atheist compared to the non-moralizing god target. There was 
also a significant interaction between the simple contrast and values match for 
anger, F(1, 338) = 5.49, p = .020, fear, F(1, 337) = 8.05, p = .005, and sadness 
F(1, 338) = 9.99, p = .002. For the five negative emotional reactions, there were 
no other significant interactions with either the complex or simple contrast. 
For the emotional reaction of general warmth to the target, there was a 
significant main effect of the complex contrast (such that the atheist/non-
moralizing god targets elicited less warmth than the moralizing god targets), F(1, 
337) = 5.78, p = .017, and the simple contrast (such that the atheist targets elicited 
less warmth than the non-moralizing god targets), F(1, 337) = 10.42, p = .001, but 
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no significant interactions with either the complex or simple contrast. For the 
emotional reaction of happiness, there was a significant main effect of the simple 
contrast (such that the atheist targets elicited less happiness than the non-
moralizing god targets), F(1, 338) = 8.89, p = .003, but no main effect of the 
complex contrast and no significant interactions with either the simple or complex 
contrast. For both amusement and compassion, there were no significant main 
effects of the complex or simple contrast or significant interactions with either of 
these contrasts. 
Social distance dependent measure. For the measure of preferred social 
distance from the target, the contrast effects pattern predicted by the religious 
prosociality perspective was not supported. However, there was a significant main 
effect of the simple contrast (such that participants wanted to be farther from 
atheist targets than non-moralizing god targets), F(1, 338) = 14.02, p < .001, but 
no main effect of the complex contrast and no significant interactions with either 
the simple or complex contrast. 
Omnibus Test Results 
 After running the ANOVAs with contrast codes to examine the a priori 
hypotheses, I ran the same 2 (values match: high, low) X 3 (target god belief: 
atheist, non-moralizing god, moralizing god) X 2 (participant gender: male, 
female) between-subjects ANOVAs as omnibus tests to more thoroughly examine 
the effects of target god belief. 
Activity preferences dependent measures. With regard to the 
cooperation activity, there was a significant main effect of gender, such that men 
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rated the activity as more preferable than women, F(1, 341) = 4.20, p = .041, ηp2 = 
.012. For the cooperation activity, there were no other significant main effects or 
interactions. With regard to the competition activity, there was also a significant 
main effect of gender, such that men rated the activity as more preferable than 
women, F(1, 341) = 27.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .076. For the competition activity, there 
were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
 With regard to the conversation activity, there was a significant main 
effect of values match, such that participants rated the activity as more preferable 
with the high values match targets than the low values match targets, F(1, 342) = 
8.78, p = .003, ηp2 = .025. For the conversation activity, there were no other 
significant main effects or interactions. Finally, with regard to both the trust 
activity and the minimal interaction activity, there were no significant main 
effects or interactions. 
Perceived target traits dependent measures. With regard to perceived 
target warmth, there was a significant interaction between target god belief and 
participant gender, F(2, 341) = 3.47, p = .032, ηp2 = .020 (see Figure 7). The 
target god belief main effect was also significant, F(2, 341) = 8.30, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.046, as was the participant gender main effect, F(1, 341) = 8.49, p = .004, ηp2 = 
.024. However, because the interaction was significant, I did not interpret these 
main effects. Rather, I examined the differences among the target god belief 
conditions separately by males and females. The female simple effect test 
indicated statistically significant differences among the means F(2, 207) = 11.80, 
p < .001, whereas the male simple effect test was non-significant, F(2, 140) = 
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1.11, p = .331. Within the female participants, Tukey post hoc tests indicated that 
atheist targets were perceived as significantly less warm than both the believers in 
a non-moral god (p < .001) and the believers in a moral god (p = .001). Within the 
female participants, ratings of target warmth did not significantly differ between 
the non-moral god targets and the moral god targets. 
 With regard to perceived warmth, there was also a significant main effect 
of values match, such that participants judged high values match targets as more 
warm than the low values match targets, F(1, 341) = 25.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .069. 
There were no other significant main effects or interactions for perceived target 
warmth. 
 With regard to perceived target prosociality, there was a significant 
interaction between target god belief and participant gender, F(2, 337) = 4.14, p = 
.017, ηp2 = .02 (see Figure 8). The target god belief main effect was also 
significant, F(2, 337) = 8.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .050, as was the participant gender 
main effect, F(1, 337) = 5.80, p = .017, ηp2 = .017. However, because the 
interaction was significant, I did not interpret these main effects. Rather, I 
examined the differences among the target god belief conditions separately by 
males and females. The female simple effect test indicated statistically significant 
differences among the means F(2, 205) = 12.86, p < .001, whereas the male 
simple effect test was non-significant, F(2, 138) = 2.09, p = .128. Within the 
female participants, Tukey post hoc tests indicated that atheist targets were 
perceived as significantly less prosocial than both the believers in a non-moral 
god (p < .001) and the believers in a moral god (p < .001). Within the female 
39 
participants, ratings of target prosociality did not significantly differ between the 
non-moral god targets and the moral god targets. 
 With regard to perceived prosociality, there was also a significant main 
effect of values match, such that participants judged high values match targets as 
more reciprocal than the low values match targets, F(1, 337) = 17.06, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .048. There were no other significant main effects or interactions for 
perceived target warmth. 
 With regard to perceived morality, there was a significant main effect of 
values match, such that participants judged the high values match targets as more 
moral than the low values match targets, F(1, 337) = 11.80, p = .001, ηp2 = .034. 
There was also a significant main effect of target god belief, such that participants 
judged the believers in a moral god as the most moral, followed by the believers 
in a non-moral god and the atheist, F(2, 337) = 22.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .116. Tukey 
post hoc tests indicated that participants judged the atheists to be less moral than 
both the believers in a non-moral God (p < .001) and the believers in a moral God 
(p < .001). Participants also judged believers in a moral god to be significantly 
more moral than believers in a non-moral god (p = .016). Finally, there were no 
other significant main effects or interactions. 
Emotional reactions dependent measures. The emotional reactions of 
anger, sadness, and fear showed similar patterns, such that there were significant 
interactions between target god belief and values match [anger: F(2, 338) = 3.36, 
p = .036, ηp2 = .019; sadness: F(2, 338) = 6.78, p = .001, ηp2 = .039; fear: F(2, 
337) = 4.23, p = .015, ηp2 = .024] (see Figures 9, 10, 11). For all three emotional 
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reactions, there were also significant main effects of target god belief [anger: F(2, 
338) = 7.29, p = .001, ηp2 = .041; sadness: F(2, 338) = 6.50, p = .002, ηp2 = .037; 
fear: F(2, 337) = 3.56, p = .030, ηp2 = .021], as well as significant main effects of 
values match [anger: F(1, 338) = 5.19, p = .023, ηp2 = .015; sadness: F(1, 338) = 
4.78, p = .029, ηp2 = .014; fear: F(1, 337) = 5.17, p = .024, ηp2 = .015]. However, 
because the interactions were significant, I did not interpret these main effects. 
Rather, I examined the differences among the target god belief conditions 
separately by high values match and low values match. The low values match 
simple effect tests indicated statistically significant differences among the means 
[anger: F(2, 172) = 7.69, p = .001; sadness: F(2, 172) = 10.60, p < .001; fear: F(2, 
171) = 6.39, p = .002] where as the high values match simple effect tests were 
non-significant [anger: F(2, 172) = 1.48, p = .230; sadness: F(2, 172) = 0.07, p = 
.933; fear: F(2, 172) = 0.27, p = .766]. Within the low values match participants, 
Tukey post hoc tests indicated that participants reported significantly more anger, 
sadness, and fear in response to the atheist targets than both the believers in a non-
moral god (anger: p < .001; sadness: p < .001; fear: p = .003) and the believers in 
a moral god (anger: p = .087; sadness: p < .001; fear: p = .019), although this 
comparison of the atheist targets to the believers in a moral god reached only 
marginal significance. Within the low values match participants, ratings of anger, 
sadness, and fear did not significantly differ between the non-moral god targets 
and the moral god targets. For anger, sadness, and fear, there were no other 
significant main effects or interactions. 
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For the emotional reaction of pity, there was a significant main effect of 
target god belief, such that participants indicated that the atheist targets elicited 
the most pity, followed by the believers in a moral god and the believers in a non-
moral god, F(2, 338) = 3.62, p = .028, ηp2 = .021. Tukey post hoc tests indicated 
that participants reported greater pity in response to the atheists than in response 
to both the believers in a non-moral God (p = .035) and the believers in a moral 
God (p = .069), although this last effect is only marginally significant. 
Furthermore, participants did not significantly differ in their ratings of pity in 
response to the believers in a non-moral God and the believers in a moral God. 
With regard to pity, there was also a marginally significant main effect of 
participant gender, such that men reported greater pity than women, F(1, 338) = 
3.79, p = .053, ηp2 = .011. There were no other significant main effects or 
interactions.  
For the emotional reaction of moral disgust, there was a significant main 
effect of target god belief, such that participants indicated that the atheist targets 
elicited the most moral disgust, followed by the believers in a moral god and the 
believers in a non-moral god, F(2, 337) = 10.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .059. Tukey post 
hoc tests indicated that participants reported greater moral disgust in response to 
the atheists than in response to both the believers in a non-moral God (p < .001) 
and the believers in a moral God (p = .001). Furthermore, participants did not 
significantly differ in their ratings of moral disgust in response to the believers in 
a non-moral God and the believers in a moral God. There was also a significant 
main effect of values match, such that participants indicated greater moral disgust 
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in response to the low values match targets than the high values match targets, 
F(1, 337) = 4.54, p = .034, ηp2 = .013. There were no other significant main 
effects or interactions.  
The emotional reactions of happiness and general warmth showed similar 
patterns; there were significant main effects of target god belief, such that 
participants indicated that the believers in a moral god elicited the most happiness 
and general warmth, followed by the believers in a non-moral god and the 
atheists, [happiness: F(2, 338) = 6.34, p = .002, ηp2 = .036; general warmth: F(2, 
337) = 8.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .046]. Tukey post hoc tests indicated that participants 
reported less happiness and general warmth in response to the atheists than in 
response to both the believers in a non-moral God (happiness: p = .004; general 
warmth: p = .001) and the believers in a moral God (happiness: p = .002; general 
warmth: p < .001). Furthermore, participants did not significantly differ in their 
ratings of happiness and general warmth in response to the believers in a non-
moral God and the believers in a moral God. 
There were also significant main effects of values match with regard to 
happiness, general warmth, and amusement, such that participants indicated 
greater happiness, general warmth, and amusement in response to the high values 
match targets than the low values match targets, [happiness: F(1, 338) = 10.91, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .031; general warmth: F(1, 337) = 17.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .050; 
amusement: F(1, 338) = 11.38, p = .001, ηp2 = .033]. With regard to both 
happiness and compassion, there were main effects of participant gender, such 
that women reported greater happiness and compassion than men [happiness: F(1, 
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338) = 17.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .048; compassion: F(1, 337) = 7.60, p = .006, ηp2 = 
.022]. There were no other significant main effects or interactions.  
Social distance dependent measure. With regard to social distance, there 
was a significant main effect of values match, such that participants indicated a 
desire to be closer to the high values match targets than the low values match 
targets, F(1, 338) = 20.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .056. There was also a significant main 
effect of target god belief, such that participants indicated a desire to be closest to 
the believers in a non-moral God, followed by the believers in a moral god and 
the atheists, F(2, 338) = 7.05, p = .001, ηp2 = .040. Tukey post hoc tests indicated 
that participants desired to be farther from the atheists than both the believers in a 
non-moral God (p < .001) and the believers in a moral God (p = .063), although 
this last effect is only marginally significant. Furthermore, participants did not 
significantly differ in their desire for distance from the believers in a non-moral 
God and the believers in a moral God. Finally, there were no other significant 
main effects or interactions.  
Exploratory Analyses 
Exploratory analyses were conducted with the individual difference 
measures of Religious Fundamentalism, Intrinsic Religiosity, Extrinsic 
Religiosity, and Right Wing Authoritarianism. I performed a series of three-factor 
analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) to assess the influence of target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender on each of the dependent variables, while 
controlling for each individual difference. Across all of the dependent variables, 
and when covarying out each of these four individual differences, the effects of 
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the independent variables on the dependent variables did not dramatically change. 
Some effects that were previously significant at p < .05 became only marginally 
significant at p < .10, and some effects that were previously marginally significant 
became significant at p < .05, but the overall pattern of mean differences did not 
change as a result of covarying out any of these four individual differences. 
I also explored the effects of two other individual differences: belief in a 
moralizing god and the attitude that believing in God is a value. The attitude that 
believing in God is a value was assessed with a single item (M = 4.11, SD = 1.85). 
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which a series of statements 
represented values; one item stated, “It is important to believe in God” and 
participants indicated on a six-point Likert scale the degree to which this 
statement represented a value. Belief in a moralizing god is a composite of three 
items (Cronbach’s alpha = .80, M = 0.50, SD = 1.69) measuring the participant’s 
beliefs that god monitors one’s behaviors, rewards one’s good behaviors, and 
punishes one’s bad behaviors. As with the previously mentioned individual 
differences, I performed a series of three-factor ANCOVAs to assess the influence 
of target god belief, values match, and target gender on each of the dependent 
variables while controlling for each individual difference. Across all of the 
dependent variables, and when covarying out each of these two individual 
differences, the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables 
did not dramatically change. 
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DISCUSSION 
From the religious prosociality perspective, people were hypothesized to 
demonstrate prejudice toward any target who did not believe in a moralizing god. 
In contrast, from the sociofunctional perspective, people were hypothesized to 
demonstrate prejudice toward any target who did not share their values. Overall, 
the findings demonstrated support for the sociofunctional perspective and lack of 
support for the religious prosociality perspective. 
With regard to the sociofunctional perspective, I found an effect of values 
match in the expected direction (more positivity toward high values match 
targets) across a variety of dependent measures (conversation activity, perceived 
target warmth/morality/prosociality, negative emotions, positive emotions, and 
social distance). Furthermore, the sociofunctional perspective predicts that a 
perceived threat to group values should result in a primary emotional reaction of 
disgust, with possible secondary emotional reactions of anger and fear (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005). In support of this, the results indicated a significant main effect 
of values match for moral disgust, anger, fear, and also sadness, such that 
participants rated the low values match targets as eliciting these emotions more so 
than the high values match targets. 
With regard to the religious prosociality perspective, I found an effect of 
target god belief across a variety of dependent measures (perceived target 
morality, negative emotions, positive emotions, and social distance), but this 
effect was not in the expected direction. The religious prosociality perspective 
explicitly predicts that people should demonstrate greater positivity toward 
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believers in a moralizing god than atheists, and I did find this pattern across many 
dependent measures. However, the religious prosociality perspective further 
predicts that people should demonstrate greatest positivity toward believers in a 
moralizing god, as opposed to both believers in a non-moralizing god and atheists, 
and that people should demonstrate equivalent negativity toward believers in a 
non-moralizing god and atheists. This pattern was not found for any of the 
dependent measures. The pattern found in the current study indicated that 
participants experienced greatest negativity toward atheists, as opposed to both 
believers in a moralizing god and believers in a non-moralizing god. Also, results 
indicated equivalent positivity toward believers in a moralizing god and believers 
in a non-moralizing god (although differences between believers in a moralizing 
god and believers in a non-moralizing god reached significance in some 
instances). 
For some dependent measures, I found significant interactions between the 
independent variables. For example, target god belief interacted with values 
match for certain negative emotional reactions (anger, sadness, and fear). These 
interactions indicated that participants reacted more negatively toward the low 
values match atheist than the other five targets. This suggests that, with regard to 
certain negative emotions, as long as the target shares a perceiver’s values, the 
target should be perceived positively regardless of their god beliefs. Furthermore, 
not sharing a perceiver’s values only counts against a target if the target also does 
not believe in god. 
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Finally, target god belief interacted with participant gender with regard to 
judgments of target warmth and prosociality. Although participant gender was the 
variable included in all analyses, participant gender was matched to target gender. 
As such, these interactions suggest that, with regard to judgments of target 
characteristics, target god belief may produce varying judgments depending on 
the perceiver’s and/or target’s gender. Specifically, men and women appear to 
judge atheists equivalently negatively. However, women judge female believers 
in god (both moralizing god and non-moralizing god) more positively than female 
atheists, while men’s judgments of male believers in god do not significantly 
differ from their judgments of male atheists. 
I could not find any pattern of data to suggest why participant gender may 
interact with target god belief. In the current study, men and women participants’ 
religious beliefs and attitudes (religious fundamentalism, intrinsic religiosity, 
extrinsic religiosity, belief in a moralizing god, attitude that belief in god is a 
value, god locus of control) did not significantly differ. So, perhaps target gender 
was driving the interaction between target god belief and gender for judgments of 
target warmth and prosociality. Previous research suggests that men are more 
likely to imagine god as controlling than women (Krejci, 1998). Perhaps men 
inferred that male targets saw god as controlling, and any target who believes in a 
controlling god would be judged as relatively low on warmth and prosociality. As 
such, the judgments of male targets who believed in god did not significantly 
differ from the judgments of atheist male targets, in terms of perceived warmth 
and prosociality. 
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Overall, the data suggest that both proposed mechanisms of prejudice 
toward atheists (values match and target god belief) do impact prejudice toward 
targets. Perceivers demonstrate increased negativity toward both targets who do 
not share their values and targets who do not believe in god. For the most part, 
these mechanisms function independently. However, they appear to interact with 
regard to specific negative emotional reactions, such that perceivers feel 
especially negatively toward atheists who do not share their values. 
Alternative Explanations of Findings 
The fact that, in some instances, perceivers felt especially negative toward 
one of the targets (the low values match atheist) points to the possibility of a 
sufficiency effect. Previous research concerning judgments of target racial 
typicality has found that target skin color and target facial physiognomy (e.g., 
face shape) each serve independently as cues of racial typicality, although skin 
color appears to be a stronger cue (Stepanova & Strube, 2012). If “I believe in 
god” and “I share your values” each act as a sufficient cue of prosocial behavior, 
then the presence of only one cue should be enough to result in a positive 
evaluation of the target. This could explain the pattern that, for some of the 
negative emotion measures, participants felt relatively positively toward all 
targets who had at least one of these cues and relatively negatively toward the 
target who lacked both cues.  
I investigated this possibility using contrast codes. I examined the 
complex contrast comparing the non-moralizing god and moralizing god 
conditions pooled together to the atheist condition (contrast coefficients: atheist = 
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2, non-moralizing god = -1, moralizing god = -1) and also performed a simple 
contrast comparing the non-moralizing god condition to the moralizing god 
condition (contrast coefficients: atheist = 0, non-moralizing god = -1, moralizing 
god = 1). If the sufficiency perspective were supported, I would expect a 
significant interaction between the complex contrast (non-moralizing 
god/moralizing god vs. atheist) and values match (such that the low values atheist 
is rated more negatively than all others) and a non-significant interaction of the 
simple contrast (non-moralizing god vs. moralizing god) and values match. This 
pattern would suggest that the low values atheist alone is viewed more negatively 
than all other targets. 
I did find a pattern to support the sufficiency perspective for all five 
negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, moral disgust, and pity), as well as the 
competition activity. This pattern suggests that, with regard to negative emotions, 
presentation of at least one of the two cues (either believing in god or sharing the 
participant’s values) is enough to result in relatively positive evaluations of the 
target. However, we do not find this pattern for any of the other four activities, the 
three target traits, the four positive emotions, or social distance. So, overall, the 
low values atheist is not singled out. In general, participants view any target who 
shares a small amount of their values and any target who does not believe in god 
relatively negatively. 
Another explanation of the current study’s findings could be that 
perceived similarity to the target is mediating the effects of both target god beliefs 
and values match to the dependent measures. A plethora of previous research 
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concerning the role of similarity in interpersonal relationships has found a 
positive relationship between perceived similarity to a target and liking of the 
target (see Sunnafrank, 1983, for a review). It seems likely that participants would 
perceive themselves as more similar to the high values match targets as opposed 
to the low values match targets (since the “match” implies similarity), and that 
participants would see themselves as more similar to the targets who believe in 
god than the atheist targets (since all participants were pre-screened as believing 
in God).  
In fact, I found this pattern of similarity ratings in the current study. I ran a 
3 (target god belief) X 2 (values match) X 2 (participant gender) omnibus test 
ANOVA with similarity as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect 
of target god belief, F(2, 341) = 10.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .060, and values match, 
F(1, 341) = 49.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .127, but no other main effects or interactions. 
Tukey post hoc tests indicated that participants perceived themselves as less 
similar to atheists as compared to both the believers in a non-moral God (p < 
.001) and the believers in a moral God (p < .001), and believers in a non-moral 
god and believers in a moral god did not significantly differ from each other. 
Although I did not measure general liking as a dependent measure, I did have 
many measures that were positively and negatively valenced. Given that the high 
values match targets were generally rated more positively than the low values 
match targets, and that the targets who believe in god were rated more positively 
than the atheist targets, these relationships may be mediated by perceived 
similarity to the target. 
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Mediation was assessed using the Sobel test. Regression coefficients and 
standard errors were collected by conducting the following regression analyses: 
values match (coded as high values match = 1, low values match = -1) predicting 
similarity, values match and similarity predicting the dependent measure, target 
god belief (code 1: atheist = -2, non-moral god = 1, moral god = 1; code 2: atheist 
= 0, non-moral god = -1, moral god = 1) predicting similarity, and target god 
belief and similarity predicting the dependent measure.  Perceived similarity to 
the target was found to mediate the relationships between values match and the 
dependent measures and also target god belief (code 1, but not code 2) and the 
dependent measures at p < .05 for the following dependent measures: all three 
perceived target traits (warmth, morality, prosociality), all five negative emotions 
(sadness, anger, fear, moral disgust, pity), three of the four positive emotions 
(general warmth, happiness, amusement), and social distance. The regression 
analyses demonstrated positive relationships between values match and similarity 
(as values match increased, perceived similarity increased), as well as target god 
belief and similarity (targets who believed in god were perceived as more similar 
to the participant than atheist targets). The regression analyses also demonstrated 
positive relationships between similarity and the positively valenced dependent 
measures (perceived target traits, positive emotions, and social distance), while 
demonstrating negative relationships between similarity and the negatively 
valenced dependent measures (negative emotions). 
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Limitations of the Study 
Certain methods of the current study limit the interpretation and 
generalizability of the results. First, interpretation of the target god belief effects 
may be limited by the believability of the target who believes in a non-moralizing 
god. As previously discussed, the world’s most widespread religions often 
describe supernatural agents as able to monitor, reward, and punish human 
behavior (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). As such, it is possible that participants had 
never before encountered a target who believed in a god, but a god who did not 
monitor nor punish human behavior. Lack of familiarity with such a target may 
have resulted in participants not understanding or fully accepting the target’s 
beliefs, leading the participant to judge the believer in a non-moralizing god 
similarly to the believer in a moralizing god. 
Second, interpretation of gender effects is limited by the fact that 
participant gender was confounded with target gender. Although this allowed us 
to control for possible sexual attraction effects between participant and target, I 
am unable to determine whether the gender effects were a result of the 
participant’s gender, the target’s gender, or an interaction between the two. 
Third, the failure to find effects for the activity preference dependent 
measures may be a result of the confounding between activity domain (e.g., trust, 
competition, cooperation) and activity type (e.g., playing a game, watching a 
movie, having a discussion), as indicated by the strong correlation between the 
two “game” activities. Also, the failure to find effects for these measures may 
indicate that participants did not feel personally invested in the activities. In the 
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real world, an interaction involving trust or cooperation requires a feeling of 
personal investment in the activity since the outcome has “real world” 
consequences. In the lab, asking participants to interact with a stranger for ten 
minutes with no possibility of reward or punishment may not have allowed for 
this feeling of personal investment in the cooperation or trust activities. 
Fourth, as previously discussed, the wording of the emotional reaction 
items limits the interpretation of the emotion dependent measures results. 
Participants were asked to report the perceived emotional reactions of a person 
like them to the target, rather than their personal emotional reactions to the target. 
As such, it is possible that the participants themselves were not experiencing any 
strong emotional reactions to the targets, yet inferred that a person like them 
might experience certain emotional reactions. 
Finally, this study was conducted with an American, undergraduate, 
majority White, majority Christian, theist, convenience sample. As such, I must 
avoid overgeneralizing the results of this study to atheists, the US population in 
general, or to other cultures. 
Significance of the Findings 
The current findings lend further support to the sociofunctional 
perspective. Although the current study did not investigate perceived threat as a 
function of target values match to the participant, participants indicated greater 
negativity toward targets who shared a small amount of their values and reported 
the predicted emotional reactions to the low values match targets. The current 
findings also relate well to previous work establishing that atheists are perceived 
54 
as untrustworthy (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011). The current study 
contained a single item assessing the perceived trustworthiness of the target (this 
item was averaged into the prosociality trait composite). I ran a 3 (target god 
belief) X 2 (values match) X 2 (participant gender) omnibus test ANOVA with 
trustworthiness as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of 
values match (such that high values match targets were perceived as more 
trustworthy), F(1, 336) = 13.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .038, and a significant main effect 
of target god belief, F(2, 336) = 0.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .052, but no other main 
effects or interactions. Tukey post hoc tests indicated that participants perceived 
atheists as less trustworthy than both believers in a non-moral god (p = .018) and 
believers in a moral god (p < .001), but participants did not significantly differ in 
their ratings of believers in a non-moral god and believers in a moral god. 
The current findings raise important questions for the religious 
prosociality perspective. Previous research has established that people 
demonstrate greater prosocial behavior when they feel they are being watched and 
when they view god as more punishing (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Shariff & 
Norenzayan, 2011). In other words, individual’s beliefs about monitoring and 
punishment do predict their prosocial behaviors. However, the current study 
demonstrated that knowledge of targets’ beliefs about monitoring and punishing 
supernatural agents did not differentially predict target judgments, as long as the 
target believed in god. So, even though individual’s beliefs about supernatural 
monitoring and punishment predict their prosocial behaviors, perhaps people do 
not perceive information about another’s god beliefs as diagnostic of the other’s 
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behavior. Overall, the current study suggests that people feel more positively 
toward targets who believe in god as opposed to atheists, but this preference for 
god believers appears unrelated to beliefs about supernatural monitoring and 
punishment. 
The fact that participants felt more positively toward targets who shared a 
large amount of their values as opposed to targets who shared a small amount of 
their values is relevant to intergroup relations. Presumably, people tend to believe 
that they share more values with their ingroup members than with outgroup 
members. Previous research demonstrates that people experience psychological 
discomfort when ingroup members, but not outgroup members, violate their 
personal values (Glasford, Pratto, & Dovidio, 2008). As such, our results 
concerning target values match can be applied to many forms of prejudice, 
including religious prejudice, racial prejudice, and xenophobia. Target judgments 
related to perceived values match might also function on an individual level. So, 
we may feel negatively about another individual because we perceive that the 
individual does not share our values, ignoring the other’s group membership. On 
the individual and group level, it may be possible to reduce negativity toward 
others by portraying the other as sharing our values. In other words, focusing on 
values similarity, rather than values differences, may increase liking. 
Also, results indicate increased negativity toward atheist targets. In some 
instances, perceived values match modified this negativity, such that participants 
felt more positively toward atheists who shared a large amount of their values as 
opposed to atheists who shared a small amount of their values. So, atheists may be 
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able to increase people’s positivity toward them by focusing on values similarity. 
However, in the real world, many theists would probably doubt an atheist who 
professed to share their values. 
Future Directions 
To disentangle experimental effects of the independent variables from 
possible similarity effects, future studies could examine prejudice toward atheists 
within an atheist sample rather than a theist sample. The religious prosociality 
perspective predicts that people should anticipate cooperative interactions with 
believers in a moralizing god and non-cooperative interactions with atheists, since 
belief in a moralizing god acts as a cue of being a cooperative group member. 
This cue should function similarly, regardless of perceivers’ god beliefs, so atheist 
perceivers should also desire to avoid interaction with atheist targets. If we were 
to find that atheists desired to avoid interaction with other atheists, this would 
lend support to the religious prosociality perspective while not lending support to 
the similarity perspective. 
Also, future studies could investigate acceptance of a non-moralizing god 
image. If most Americans have only been exposed to concepts of a moralizing 
god, they may not be able to fully accept or comprehend a non-moralizing god. If 
this is the case, Americans may have only two cognitive classifications 
concerning people’s god beliefs: either you believe in a god (and all gods are 
moralizing gods) or you do not believe in a god. If this were true, to accurately 
investigate reactions to targets who believe in a non-moralizing god, studies 
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would need to be conducted in cultures where the culture’s adherents have been 
exposed to a non-moralizing god image. 
Finally, when controlling for values match, participants still felt relatively 
negative toward the atheist targets. This suggests that lacking belief in god 
presents some threat or problem aside from a values threat. Perhaps disagreeing 
about certain ideas that people perceive to be self-evident truths will lead to 
negativity, regardless of values match. For example, if I proclaim that the sky is 
red and you believe that it is blue, you probably will not feel positively toward 
me, even if we both place importance on similar values, like putting others before 
oneself. If we disagree about the “obvious” state of the universe, we may not be 
able to trust each other’s judgments in general. Future studies could explore the 
effects of this type of belief dissimilarity.   
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Table 1 
Table of means for cooperation activity broken out by target god belief, values 
match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.42 (1.64) 5.35 (2.02) 5.65 (2.08) 
     Women 5.34 (1.76) 4.76 (1.86) 4.82 (2.20) 
High 
Values    
     Men 5.33 (2.01) 5.83 (1.93) 5.22 (1.93) 
     Women 5.22 (2.23) 4.81 (2.20) 5.15 (2.22) 
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Table 2 
Table of means for trust activity broken out by target god belief, values match, 
and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.04 (2.63) 3.81 (2.38) 3.87 (2.38) 
     Women 4.86 (2.22) 3.88 (2.33) 4.12 (2.57) 
High Values    
     Men 3.92 (2.52) 4.13 (2.52) 4.04 (2.29) 
     Women 3.41 (2.47) 4.28 (2.56) 3.59 (2.08) 
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Table 3 
Table of means for competition activity broken out by target god belief, values 
match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 6.13 (1.48) 5.00 (2.06) 5.52 (1.73) 
     Women 4.56 (2.40) 4.06 (1.94) 4.42 (2.35) 
High Values    
     Men 4.92 (2.36) 6.04 (1.68) 5.35 (2.01) 
     Women 4.27 (1.97) 4.00 (2.03) 4.61 (2.11) 
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Table 4 
Table of means for conversation activity broken out by target god belief, values 
match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.50 (2.17) 5.50 (1.92) 5.61 (1.53) 
     Women 5.44 (1.89) 5.44 (1.60) 5.67 (1.87) 
High Values    
     Men 6.04 (1.43) 5.88 (1.78) 5.70 (1.40) 
     Women 5.70 (1.47) 6.19 (1.53) 5.94 (1.77) 
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Table 5 
Table of means for minimal interaction activity broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.25 (2.25) 5.04 (2.55) 4.22 (2.45) 
     Women 4.53 (2.25) 4.68 (2.16) 4.42 (2.21) 
High Values    
     Men 4.96 (2.29) 4.00 (2.30) 4.48 (1.83) 
     Women 4.81 (1.87) 5.06 (2.25) 4.91 (2.43) 
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Table 6 
Table of means for perceived target warmth broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.88 (1.05) 5.98 (0.94) 6.25 (0.85) 
     Women 5.97 (1.26) 6.56 (0.94) 6.66 (0.87) 
High Values    
     Men 6.51 (0.82) 6.63 (0.82) 6.69 (0.72) 
     Women 6.36 (1.01) 7.28 (0.64) 6.85 (0.87) 
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Table 7 
Table of means for perceived target morality broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.46 (1.52) 6.08 (1.23) 6.59 (1.11) 
     Women 5.46 (1.76) 6.26 (1.45) 7.11 (1.11) 
High Values    
     Men 6.31 (0.96) 6.65 (0.91) 6.89 (0.84) 
     Women 5.93 (1.68) 6.93 (1.08) 7.17 (1.12) 
 
69 
Table 8 
Table of means for perceived target prosociality broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.80 (1.20) 5.71 (0.87) 6.23 (0.76) 
     Women 5.93 (1.17) 6.39 (0.86) 6.60 (0.78) 
High Values    
     Men 6.38 (0.95) 6.46 (0.61) 6.60 (0.77) 
     Women 6.03 (0.94) 6.93 (0.82) 6.70 (0.84) 
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Table 9 
Table of means for anger emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 3.17 (1.54) 2.10 (0.76) 2.43 (1.18) 
     Women 2.70 (1.55) 1.91 (0.99) 2.36 (1.27) 
High Values    
     Men 2.00 (1.04) 2.02 (0.87) 2.52 (1.02) 
     Women 2.39 (1.28) 1.93 (0.99) 2.10 (0.90) 
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Table 10 
Table of means for sadness emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 2.88 (1.21) 1.90 (0.85) 2.02 (0.92) 
     Women 2.46 (1.23) 1.76 (1.07) 1.73 (1.04) 
High Values    
     Men 1.73 (0.78) 1.91 (0.69) 2.15 (0.95) 
     Women 2.04 (1.15) 1.82 (0.75) 1.71 (0.70) 
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Table 11 
Table of means for fear emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, values 
match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 2.57 (1.11) 1.75 (0.60) 1.96 (0.82) 
     Women 2.20 (1.21) 1.72 (0.94) 1.76 (1.04) 
High Values    
     Men 1.60 (0.82) 1.93 (0.97) 1.96 (0.95) 
     Women 1.90 (0.92) 1.68 (0.86) 1.49 (0.74) 
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Table 12 
Table of means for pity emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, values 
match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 3.00 (1.35) 2.63 (1.31) 2.26 (1.04) 
     Women 2.86 (1.36) 1.88 (1.08) 2.23 (1.24) 
High Values    
     Men 2.65 (1.26) 2.41 (1.03) 2.57 (0.93) 
     Women 2.33 (1.51) 2.36 (1.13) 2.32 (1.04) 
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Table 13 
Table of means for moral disgust emotional reaction broken out by target god 
belief, values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 3.00 (1.86) 1.96 (0.86) 2.07 (0.99) 
     Women 2.70 (1.50) 1.68 (1.15) 1.94 (1.51) 
High Values    
     Men 1.81 (0.94) 1.80 (0.88) 2.07 (1.09) 
     Women 2.51 (1.62) 1.72 (0.87) 1.71 (0.84) 
 
75 
Table 14 
Table of means for general warmth emotional reaction broken out by target god 
belief, values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.88 (1.68) 6.38 (1.24) 6.70 (1.15) 
     Women 6.06 (1.49) 6.81 (1.03) 6.73 (1.28) 
High Values    
     Men 6.92 (0.78) 6.83 (0.98) 7.22 (0.74) 
     Women 6.49 (1.60) 7.33 (0.68) 7.03 (0.90) 
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Table 15 
Table of means for happiness emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.81 (1.39) 5.00 (1.50) 5.39 (1.03) 
     Women 5.17 (0.96) 5.76 (1.00) 5.80 (1.05) 
High Values    
     Men 5.35 (0.95) 5.67 (1.26) 5.41 (1.47) 
     Women 5.54 (1.02) 6.19 (1.06) 6.16 (0.71) 
 
77 
Table 16 
Table of means for amusement emotional reaction broken out by target god belief, 
values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 5.10 (1.25) 4.87 (1.34) 5.46 (0.86) 
     Women 4.80 (1.16) 5.37 (1.10) 5.20 (1.28) 
High Values    
     Men 5.35 (1.10) 5.54 (1.23) 5.48 (0.95) 
     Women 5.41 (1.55) 5.65 (1.21) 5.97 (0.96) 
 
78 
Table 17 
Table of means for compassion emotional reaction broken out by target god 
belief, values match, and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.04 (1.64) 4.21 (1.45) 4.04 (1.59) 
     Women 4.17 (1.31) 4.50 (1.22) 4.21 (1.17) 
High Values    
     Men 3.88 (1.19) 3.80 (1.64) 4.37 (1.46) 
     Women 4.19 (1.28) 4.90 (1.75) 4.91 (1.19) 
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Table 18 
Table of means for social distance broken out by target god belief, values match, 
and participant gender 
 
 Atheist Non-moralizing God Moralizing God 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Low Values    
     Men 4.46 (1.88) 4.79 (1.42) 4.76 (1.28) 
     Women 4.63 (1.59) 5.15 (1.20) 5.03 (1.19) 
High Values    
     Men 5.25 (1.25) 5.85 (1.11) 5.50 (1.38) 
     Women 4.79 (1.55) 6.15 (1.32) 5.43 (1.65) 
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Table 19 
 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Matrix of the Activity Preference, Trait Composite, and Social Distance Dependent 
Measures 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Conversation -------- .17** .18** .27** -.01 .28** .19** .26** .30** 
2. Cooperation  -------- -.05 .23** .50** .15** .01 .11* .23** 
3. Minimal   -------- .09 -.01 .10 .04 .11* -.07 
4. Trust    --------- .23** .06 .01 .11* .15** 
5. Competition     -------- -.06 -.07 -.03 .08 
6. Warmth      ------- .55** .80** .57** 
7. Morality       -------- .60** .42** 
8. Reciprocity        -------- .55** 
9. Social Distance         -------- 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 20 
 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Matrix of the Emotional Reaction Dependent Measures 
 
Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Anger -------- .52** .69** .52** .65** -.30** -.15** .05 -.38** 
2. Fear  -------- .72** .49** .53** -.22** -.17** .08 -.32** 
3. Sadness   -------- .63** .65** -.24** -.13* .13* -.36** 
4. Pity    --------- .51** -.21** -.09 .19** -.27** 
5. Moral Disgust     ------- -.29** -.20** .02 -.42** 
6. Happiness      ------- .57** .48** .49** 
7. Amusement       -------- .32** .38** 
8. Compassion        -------- .16** 
9. General Warmth         -------- Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
  
82 
Table 21  
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Matrix of the Emotional Reaction Dependent Measures with the Activity Preference 
Dependent Measures  
Measure Conversation Cooperate Minimal Trust Compete 
Anger -.24** -.11* -.06 -.10 .02 
Fear -.17** -.07 -.10 -.03 .06 
Sadness -.19** -.08 .01 .02 .03 
Pity -.10 -.05 -.02 .03 .10 
Moral Disgust -.27** -.10 -.03 -.14** -.02 
Happiness .23** .17** -.01 .10 .00 
Amusement .22** .12* .02 .12* .04 
Compassion .08 .08 .00 .16** .03 
General Warmth .36** .16** .07 .11* .00 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 22 
 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation Matrix of the Emotional Reaction Dependent Measures with the Trait Composite and 
Social Distance Dependent Measures 
 
Measure Warmth Morality Reciprocity Similar Social Distance 
Anger -.39** -.38** -.37** -.32** -.38** 
Fear -.39** -.28** -.34** -.19** -.20** 
Sadness -.38** -.38** -.35** -.25** -.26** 
Pity -.28** -.37** -.30** -.23** -.23** 
Moral Disgust -.37** -.47** -.39** -.40** -.42** 
Happiness .50** .39** .47** .41** .49** 
Amusement .43** .30** .39** .34** .42** 
Compassion .16** .13* .17** .10 .20** 
General Warmth .63** .46** .59** .58** .56** Note. *p < .05, **p < .01
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Figure 7. Judgments of target warmth as a function of target god belief and 
participant gender (n = 341). 
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Figure 8. Judgments of target prosociality as a function of target god belief and 
participant gender (n = 337). 
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Figure 9. Emotional reaction of anger as a function of target god belief and values 
match (n = 337). 
1.51.71.9
2.12.32.5
2.72.93.1
Atheist Non-Moral God Moral God
A
n
ge
r
Target God Belief
Target God Belief x Values Match
High ValuesLow Values
 93 
 
Figure 10. Emotional reaction of sadness as a function of target god belief and 
values match (n = 337). 
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Figure 11. Emotional reaction of fear as a function of target god belief and values 
match (n = 337). 
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APPENDIX A  EXAMPLE PROFILE 
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Gender:     Female 
 
Age:      19 
 
About me: I just moved here from Ohio. I have two 
awesome dogs at home that I miss a lot. 
Most of the time I’m in class or making 
drinks at the coffee shop I work at, but I try 
to hang out with my friends as much as I 
can. 
 
Values:     The two of you are a 91% values match. 
 
Favorite Activities:  -She enjoys watching movies. 
 -She enjoys travelling. 
 -She does not enjoy arts and crafts. 
 
Beliefs About God:  -She believes in God. 
-She does not believe that God monitors 
one’s behaviors. 
-She does not believe that God punishes 
one’s bad behaviors. 
 
Life Goals:  The two of you are a 60% life goals match.  
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APPENDIX B  DEPENDENT MEASURES 
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Preference for interaction with different types of activities: 
Instructions: “Below is a list of different types of activities. We would like for 
you to rate how much you would prefer to perform each of the activities with the 
person in the profile. Please read the description of each activity carefully. After 
you have rated all of the activities, you and the person in the profile will meet 
next door and perform the activity that you rated as the most preferable. Each of 
the activities will take about 15 minutes.” 
Response Scale: 1 (I would strongly prefer to not perform this activity with this 
person) to 8 (I would strongly prefer to perform this activity with this person) 
 
1) [Cooperation activity] “You and the other person will play a game. The goal of 
the game is for both of you, as a team, to earn 50 points. To earn the points, you 
will have to work together because you cannot earn the 50 points by acting 
alone.” 
2) [Trust activity] “You and the other person will meet and have a discussion. 
You will each tell a story about a challenging moment in your life. First, the other 
person will tell you their story, and then you will tell your story. We ask that you 
be completely honest and open.” 
3) [Competition activity] “You and the other person will play a game. The goal of 
the game is to be the first person to earn 10 points. You and the other person will 
each be trying to win the game first. You will have to do your best to earn points 
for yourself while taking away points from the other person.” 
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4) [Conversation activity, i.e. no cooperation, trust, or competition] “You and the 
other person will watch a short clip from a movie together and then discuss what 
you watched with each other. Please feel free to talk about what you’re seeing 
with the other person while the clip is playing.” 
5) [Minimal interaction activity] “You and the other person will watch a short clip 
from a movie together. However, we ask that you remain completely silent while 
watching the movie clip. Then, each of you will write some brief comments 
giving your reaction to the film clip. Please do not discuss your reaction to the 
clip with the other person as we do not want your opinion to influence the other 
person’s opinion.” 
 
6) Rank Order: Now that you’ve rated each activity individually, we would like 
for you to rank the activities. Please place a “1” next to your most desired activity, 
a “2” next to your second most desired activity, etc. 
 
Target Impressions 
Instructions: “We would like for you to give us your impressions of the person in 
the profile. What kind of person does the person in the profile seem like to you? 
To me, the person in the profile seems…”  
Response Scale: [8-point scale, with each end representing one of two opposing 
traits] 
7) Competent vs. Incompetent (R) 
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8) Like he/she cannot distinguish right from wrong vs. Like he/she can distinguish 
right from wrong 
9) Warm vs. Cold (R) 
10) Cooperative vs. Uncooperative (R) 
11) Trustworthy vs. Untrustworthy (R) 
12) Mean vs. Kind 
13) Selfish vs. Generous 
14) Moral vs. Immoral (R) 
15) Judgmental vs. Accepting 
16) Dishonest vs. Honest 
17) Friendly vs. Unfriendly (R) 
18) Similar to me vs. Not similar to me (R) 
 
Feelings toward the target: 
19) Please rate how warm or cold you feel about the person in the profile. 
[9 point scale: Very Cold, Quite Cold, Fairly Cold, A bit more cold than 
warm feeling, No feeling at all, A bit more warm than cold feeling, Fairly 
warm, Quite warm, Very warm] 
Instructions: In general, if the person in the profile were to interact with someone 
like you, how likely is it that the target would make a person like you feel…” 
Response Scale: 8-point scale, very unlikely to very likely 
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20-35) Angry, Mad, Sad, Depressed, Afraid, Frightened, Morally disgusted, 
Morally Sickened, Happy, Joyful, Pity, Sorry for them, Sympathetic, 
Compassionate, Amused, Entertained 
 
Social Distance: 
Instructions: “Please indicate your feelings about the person in the profile.” 
Response Scale: 8-point scale, with each end representing one of two opposing 
preferences 
36) I would prefer to avoid participating in social activities with this person vs. I 
would prefer to participate in social activities with this person 
37) I would prefer to avoid living with this person as a roommate vs. I would 
prefer to live with this person as a roommate 
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To: Craig Nagoshi PSY  
From: Mark Roosa, Chair Soc Beh IRB  
Date: 08/29/2012  
Committee Action: Exemption Granted  
IRB Action Date: 08/29/2012  
IRB Protocol #: 1208008134  
Study Title: Judgments of Online Profiles  
 
The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the 
Institutional Review Board pursuant to Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 
46.101(b)(2).  
 
This part of the federal regulations requires that the information be recorded by 
investigators in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or 
through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information 
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably 
place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability, or be damaging to the 
subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.  
 
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.
  
 
